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This paper provides a theory of migrants’ decisions to remit and save under
uncertainty in connection with future location decisions. We show that the
impact of remittances on the risk faced by the migrant is more complex than
usually acknowledged. On the one hand, their effect on aggregate risk is non-
monotonic. On the other hand, their impact on the geographical location of
risk might be counter-intuitive, as remittances increase the migrant’s expo-
sure to risk in the origin country. Also, marginal returns to remittances may
be increasing, at least locally, due to the endogeneity of the future location.
Interior solutions are therefore not guaranteed, and liquidity constraints faced
by migrants may be binding. Finally, undocumented migrants are shown to
be more likely to remit than legal migrants.
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The remittances of international migrants provide developing countries with important mon-
etary ﬂows. In contexts of imperfect capital markets, this additional source of income allows
recipient households to relax liquidity constraints and to develop their members’ education
(Edwards & Ureta (2003); Yang (2008); Yang (2009) and Calero et al. (2009)), productive
assets (Adams (1998)), and/or social capital (Gallego & Mendola (2009)).
In this paper, we provide a theory of migrants’ decisions to remit and save under uncer-
tainty in connection with future location decisions. The model captures two crucial aspects of
remittances, namely that they can be considered as pure investments and/or as precautionary
investments. As far as pure investments are concerned, Adams (1998) ﬁnds that the marginal
propensity to invest is signiﬁcantly higher for households with a migrant member. Investment
by the family, or in certain circumstances by the migrant him/herself, is therefore a fundamen-
tal motive for remittances. It is also often argued that remittances may serve the purpose of
insuring against income shocks by improving the option of returning to the origin country.
We show that the distribution of risks between the host and the origin country plays a
crucial rule in the remitting behavior of migrants, as documented by recent empirical con-
tributions. Indeed, Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo (2006) show that remittances are signiﬁcantly
impacted by the risk faced by the migrant in the host labor market, whereas Dustmann et al.
(2010) shows that undocumented migrants are more likely to remit. The model developed
below takes account of the initial distribution of risk between host and origin countries and
reproduces these stylized facts. For instance, undocumented migrants are likely to face most
of their uncertainty in the host country, while documented migrants’ risk is mainly located in
their origin region where their career prospects may be less clear.
One of the contributions of the paper is to show that remittances have indeed an important
impact on the risk faced by the migrant, but in a more complex way than usually acknowl-
edged. Since the migrant is uncertain about her future location, she faces risk in both host and
origin countries. Two important insights can be drawn from the model regarding the effect
of remittances on risk. On the one hand, their effect on aggregate risk is non-monotonic. On
the other hand, their impact on the geographical location of risk might be counter-intuitive, as
remittances increase the migrant’s exposure to risk in the origin country.
1Our model also provides some insights about the interaction between remittances and the
migrant’s future location. In a pure investment perspective, we show that, due to the uncer-
tainty regarding migrant’s future location, marginal returns to remittances may be increasing,
at least locally. The intuition is that return prospects interact with remittances. Indeed, on the
one hand, the incentive to remit increases with the probability to return to the origin coun-
try. On the other hand, the probability to return to the origin country is naturally positively
inﬂuenced by remittances in the sense that investments at home increase the value of return.
The model also provides insights about the role played by the migrant’s characteristics.
For instance, the wealth of the family left behind has a negative effect on remittances. How-
ever, migrants may face liquidity constraints, and these constraints have an impact on the link
between remittances and the migrant’s wage at the time of arrival in the host country. Under
interior savings, the migrant’s initial wage has no impact on remittances, whereas this impact
is positive for constrained migrants.
The economic literature on migrants’ remittances and return migration
Apart from altruistic purposes, remittances are often seen as an element of a contract be-
tween the sender and the recipients.1 First, this contract can be considered as a mutual insur-
ance contract: since migration contributes to the diversiﬁcation of the family’s income sources
(Stark & Levhari (1982)), remittances can play the role of insurance transfers between the mi-
grant and the parent (de la Briere et al. (2002)). Second, a loan contract in which remittances
act as a repayment on the investment initially made by parents in migration transaction costs or
even in schooling. Third, according to Cox (1987), remittances may be a form of payment for
services offered by the family, for instance, taking care of the migrant’s cattle or her household
members left behind. Another explanation of remittances pertains to the strategic bequest mo-
tive (Bernheim et al. (1985)): if the parents can credibly commit to disinherit their child, they
are able to attract care and transfers by designing an appropriate reward or bequest function.
In this framework, the share of the inheritance that is captured by each heir is increasing in
the relative amounts remitted. The empirical relevance of this explanation has been tested and
conﬁrmed by Hoddinott (1994) and de la Briere et al. (2002). Finally, the investment motive
appears in some empirical contributions: Osili (2007) provides an investigation of Nigerian
1Lucas & Stark (1985) are the ﬁrst to study the various motives for remittances. Rapoport & Docquier (2006)
provide an extensive survey of this topic.
2migrants’ investments in their origin country, whereas Osili (2004) focuses more speciﬁcally
on the beneﬁts of housing investments. However, on the whole, the investment motive seems
overlooked, at least in the theoretical literature, and yet the validity of this motive seems highly
relevant.
Regarding the literature on return migration, two theories about the length of stay in the
host country are competing. The ﬁrst one is a life cycle theory, in which households choose the
length of stay in order to ﬁnd a trade-off between the beneﬁt from higher earnings or returns
to education obtained in the host country and the cost of living abroad, such as differences
in purchasing powers across countries (Stark et al. (1997), Dustmann (2003)). The second
theory emphasizes the importance of "target earnings" which must be reached in order to
start investments in origin countries in the presence of borrowing constraints (Dustmann &
Kirchkamp (2002), Mesnard (2004), Djajic (2010)).2 Yang (2006) uses exchange rate shocks
to empirically oppose both theories and ﬁnds a larger support for the life cycle theory.
Our modeling strategy differs from the existing literature and tries to gather both explana-
tions.
First, to the best of our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst to treat endogenous return mi-
gration with both savings and remittances. The existing models mostly study the interaction
between savings and the length of stay before return migration. The introduction of remit-
tances allows us two compare two technologies of transferring resources to the future which
differ in several aspects. Whereas savings can be used in both locations, the return to remit-
tances is mostly enjoyed in case of return. The return to remittances may be large, but even if
it is lower than that of savings, we show that remittances may be used as a means of mitigating
risk. We then say that remittances have a precautionary motive. Furthermore, remittances may
be subject to agency costs, which we describe below. Finally, the introduction of remittances
is particularly relevant since recent contributions (Dustmann & Mestres (2009) and Sinning
(2009)) show that migrant’s remitting behavior is intrinsically related to her return intentions.
Second, whereas most theoretical contributions model savings and migration duration as
simultaneous decisions, our model introduces a sequence between both decisions. The reason
thereof is that future wages in both locations are uncertain, and we argue that there is no reason
2Both theories may be affected by location-speciﬁc preferences (Hill (1987), Djajic & Milbourne (1988)).
3for the ex ante return decision to be sunk when wages become observable. In other words, the
migrant should make a decision on a potential return at a particular moment in time only when
wages in both locations at this moment are observed.
These two aspects of the model generate both life cycle and target earnings considerations.
On the one hand, the migrant’s location choice is made when wages are observed. In this
sense, return migration is dictated by a life-cycle approach, since location is chosen on the
basis of income maximization. On the other hand, the probability to return is endogenously
determined by previous decisions on savings and remittances. Whether this investment reaches
a level sufﬁcient to trigger a return depends on the realization of wages.
Investment in an agency relationship, the example of social capital
Since the migrant is physically absent from her origin country, she needs to hire an in-
termediary. Naturally, her family can play this role. As in a classical agency problem, how-
ever, information asymmetries prevent the migrant from specifying the investment effort in
an enforceable contract. In order to integrate this restriction, our framework assumes that the
migrant has zero discretion over the allocation of remittances between the agent’s consump-
tion and investment. In such a context, the agent (which we will call the parent) will have a
higher incentive to invest if she also derives some beneﬁts. In this paper, we take the exam-
ple of a household public good. This modelling strategy is interesting for two reasons: ﬁrst,
it solves part of the problems inherent to imperfect monitoring by the migrant and, second,
it is highly relevant empirically. Let us take the example of social capital. Once abroad, the
migrant is indeed unable to fuel or invest in his social network by himself. And the parents
or relatives in the origin country can indeed serve as agents and invest resources on his behalf
(see Demonsant (2007) and Gallego & Mendola (2009) on the link between social capital and
remittances). Moreover, social capital is fundamental in developing countries. In a context of
market imperfections, information and reputation play important roles in economic transac-
tions. For instance, social capital could secure access to credit or positively impact on success
in small-scale enterprises such as agricultural trade (Fafchamps (2002)). Osili (2004) argues
that remittances are a way for migrants to keep access to community resources. As already
stressed, in a context of weakness of formal institutions, access to informal local public goods
is a prerequisite for returning to communities of origin. Such an argument can be interpreted
as a lower bound to investments in social capital. At higher levels, some migrants are reported
4to ﬁnance schools, churches or mosques in their village of origin. Another form of investment
is also covered by our framework, namely housing. Indeed, as argued by Osili (2004), ﬁrst,
it beneﬁts to the whole household. Second, in some areas, housing can be considered as an
irreversible investment given the low liquidity level of the renting or secondary market. It is
therefore, at the same time, illiquid and immobile, just as social capital. The same can be said
of investments in land improvements if land markets are imperfect. It follows that the migrant
can only draw the beneﬁts in case of return.
The paper is organized as follows. The general setting is introduced in Section 2. Since
the papers aims at analyzing two types of motives for remittances, namely pure investment
and precautionary investment, two cases are studied. The case of risk neutral migrants is
presented in Section 3 in order to focus on the pure investment motive. In Section 4, the case
of risk averse migrants is analyzed, thereby introducing the precautionary investment motive.
Comparative statics of both cases are presented in Section 5. Concluding remarks are provided
in Section 6.
2 General setting
There are two periods t 2 f1;2g, and two locations, namely the country of origin o and the
host country h. There are two agents, namely the migrant m, and the parent p. The parent lives
in both periods in the country of origin. The migrant lives in the host country in the ﬁrst period
and has the possibility to save s and to send remittances r to the household in the host country.
Given the remittances she receives, the parent in the origin country invests x in an asset which
provides a ﬁxed return R. Since the migrant has potentially contributed to this investment, the
returns of the latter are considered as a public good which beneﬁts to the migrant in case of
return.3 In the second period, the migrant observes the wage gap between the labor markets in
the host and the origin countries and gets to decide whether to return to the home country or
to stay in the host country.
The following analytical developments are divided into two parts with the aim of distin-
3For example, the parent can invest in housing, in family businesses or in social capital inside the community.
The returns to these activities can easily be considered as public among family members. Investments in social
capital in the country of origin can take the following forms: ﬁnancing of ceremonies and parties, contribution to
the provision of public goods, provision of credit to other community members, creation of economic activities
generating employment at the local level,...
5guishing between the pure investment and the precautionary investment motives. In the ﬁrst
part, in order to focus on the pure investment motive, the migrant is assumed to be risk neutral.
This allows us to focus on consumption smoothing over time and on the incentives to invest in
the origin country under the above mentioned agency problem. In the second part, the impact
of remittances on the migrant’s risk composition is analyzed in details.
3 The pure investment motive
3.1 Parent’s investment decision
Let us start by describing the parent’s situation. Credit markets in origin country are imperfect
and the parent faces borrowing constraints. These constraints are modeled by a borrowing
ceiling, which is assumed to be positively related to the household’s initial wealth wi since the
latter can serve the purpose of a collateral. Moreover, as argued by Osili (2004), remittances
may help the recipients to improve their access to credit. The borrowing ceiling is therefore
deﬁned as a ﬁxed proportion of the aggregate amount of money the parent is endowed with in
the ﬁrst period. We write the borrowing constraint as
b   b =  (wi + r);
where b denotes borrowing and where  2 (0;1). We normalize without loss of generality the
interest rate to one. The parent’s utility writes
V = v (wi + r   x + b) + v (wp + Rx   b);
where v(:) is a strictly concave increasing function,  is a discount factor and wp is the parent’s
second-period income. One can easily show that, as soon as the (constant) rate of return to
family investment is larger than the opportunity cost of funds, that is, the interest rate (R > 1),
borrowing is at its upper bound, namely  (wi + r).4 The parent’s objective function can thus
be rewritten as
V = v ((1 + )(wi + r)   x) + v (wp + Rx    (wi + r)):
4See Appendix 0.
6Given the remittances received in period 1, the parent’s objective is to maximize utility with
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The latter condition always holds since, by assumption, R > 1. This term is the marginal
propensity to invest of remittances. Notice that one additional unit of remittances provides
the parent with (1 + ) monetary units, that is, remittances themselves plus an extension of
the loan. Equation (2) therefore shows that some fraction of this additional income is not
invested by the parent ; instead it is consumed. This eviction effect is inherent in the agency
relationship and reduces the returns to remittances for the migrant as compared to a situation in
which she would invest by herself. Let us take the example of an exponential utility function:
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3.2 The migrant’s choice of location
Let us now turn to the migrant’s problem. She faces uncertainty about wages in period 2. Two
alternative locations are to be considered. We therefore need to deﬁne wages in both host and
origin countries:
wh = w + (Z   );
wo = w + (Z   )   Z:
7The wage gap (wh   wo) is embodied by the random variable Z  F (Z), with E(Z) = 
and V ar(Z) = 2.5 We assume that  > 0, that is, income prospects are on average better in
the host economy. It follows that
E (wh) = w;
E (wo) = w   :
 2 (0;1) is a parameter deﬁning the allocation of the income risk between both locations.
Indeed,
V ar(wh) = 
2
2;
V ar(wo) = (1   )
2 
2:
In order to understand this speciﬁcation, consider the case where  = 0. Then, wh becomes a
constant, while wo has variance 2: all the income risk is located in the origin country. One can
indeed consider that different types of migrants may face different values of . For instance,
illegal migrants are more likely to face risk in the host country, in which case  is close to one.
On the other hand, well established and integrated migrants should face very little risk in the
host country, while uncertainty in case of return is relatively higher.6
Once the wage gap has been observed in period 2, the migrant gets to decide whether to
return to the origin country or to stay in the host country. This decision is made by comparing
the utility levels in both locations. The migrant decides to return provided the utility she
derives from consumption in the origin country is higher than the utility level achieved in the
host country. The consumption levels are given by
c2o = s + Rx
 + w + (Z   )   Z;
c2h = s + w + (Z   );
5Differences in purchazing powers or location-speciﬁc preferences are neglected in this version of the model,
but the implications of such aspects are discussed in the concluding remarks. If location-speciﬁc preferences
are modeled as an additive utility premium in the origin country, such a premium would be incorporated by the
parameter  = E (Z), that is a translation of the distribution of Z. In other words, if the migrant has an intrinsic
willingness to return to the origin country, then she is ready to accept some income drop and therefore a higher
wage gap.
6The composition of the income risk is not going to play any role under risk neutrality. But since we make
use of the same income speciﬁcation under risk aversion, we already introduce it in this section.
8where s is the return to the migrant’s savings in period 1. Note that we assume for simplic-
ity of the exposition that the migrant beneﬁts from her family investment in case of return
only. This simpliﬁcation does not alter qualitatively our results, as will be discussed in the
conclusion. The migrant chooses to return to the origin country if and only if
c2o   c2h > 0 () Z < Rx
:
This condition simply states that the wage gap must not be larger than the returns to family
investment, which depends on the amount remitted in period 1.
3.3 Modeling the migrant’s preferences
Under the problem under study, the migrant’s preferences have two relevant aspects, namely
risk aversion and consumption smoothing over time. The standard representation of prefer-
ences based on expected utility does not allow us to disentangle these two aspects. Using a
standard expected utility speciﬁcation and assuming risk neutrality would impose the utility
function to be linear, in which case consumption smoothing disappears and consumption is
always at a corner in one of the two periods.
We therefore make use of the representation of preferences based on the so-called concept
of non-expected utility developed by Selden (1978) and Kreps & Porteus (1978), which allows
us to disentangle risk aversion and consumption smoothing.7 Before introducing this general
concept, let us ﬁrst deﬁne y as the component of the migrant’s income which is conditional on
location. This component is the following random variable:
y = Rx
 + w + (Z   )   Z; if Z 2 ( 1;Rx
] (4)
y = w + (Z   ); otherwise.
Using the general formulation of Kreps & Porteus (1978), the migrant’s utility writes
U = u(w1   s   r) + u

g
 1Ey (g (s + y))
	
; (5)
where both u(:) and g (:) are increasing, concave functions and g 1Ey (g (s + y)) = s + ~ y
7The models of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Selden (1978) are equivalent but we use the formulation of
Kreps and Porteus which is more intuitive. See Chapter 20 of Gollier (2004) for an introduction to non-expected
utility. An interesting recent contribution in this ﬁeld is due to Kimball & Weil (2009).
9is the certainty equivalent functional of period-2 consumption. While the form of u(:) captures
the migrant’s preferences in terms of consumption smoothing, the concavity of g(:) captures
its degree of risk aversion.
Some particular cases of Kreps-Porteus preferences are worth mentioning. First, if u(:)
and g (:) are identical, non-expected utility and standard expected utility are identical. In other
words, expected utility is a particular case of non-expected utility. Second, and particularly
useful in the next section, assuming g(:) to be linear represents the preferences of a risk-
neutral migrant’s while being able to account for his need for consumption smoothing. This
benchmark case allows us to focus on the pure investment motive while ignoring motives
related to risk.
3.4 Optimal savings and remittances under risk neutrality
Taking into account the optimal location choice, the migrant’s preferences are, following equa-
tion (5) and assuming linearity of g(:),







[s + w + Rx
 + (Z   )   Z]dF(Z) +
+1 Z
Rx





where w1 stands for migrant’s ﬁrst period income and where savings s and remittances r are
the choice variables. This simple version of the model does not account for the migrant’s
altruism towards the parent. We discuss the implication of altruism in the concluding remarks.
Uncertainty about future location may prevent the migrant from ﬁnancing remittances by
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+1 Z
Rx
(w    + Z)dF(Z)
= w + F (Rx
)[Rx
   E(Z j Z < Rx
)]:
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First notice that E(y) increases with x. This is intuitive since, as soon as there is some
probability to return, the migrant’s expected second period consumption should increase with
amounts invested by the family. More precisely, as can be seen in equation (9), marginal re-
turns to remittances are given by the combination of three factors, namely the intrinsic return
to family investment R, parent’s marginal propensity to invest and, ﬁnally, the probability to
return to the origin country and hence to beneﬁt from the household public good. Making use








Since both F(Rx) and R
1+R are strictly lower than 1 and given that the migrant can save at a
constant interest rate  > 1, remittances are only proﬁtable if  is sufﬁciently large. In other
words, in an agency relationship, the eviction effect through which part of the remittances are
consumed rather than invested can only be outweighed by an important positive impact on the
parent’s access to credit.
Making use of (9), combining both ﬁrst order conditions provides the following arbitrage
condition between remittances and savings, which imposes that the returns to both activities






However, we precisely show that such an interior solution is unlikely to obtain with a risk
11neutral migrant. Lemma 1 establishes the condition under which an interior solution for both
savings and remittances can exist. This condition relies on how the migrant’s marginal returns
to remittances evolve with remittances, that is, the sign of
@2E(y)
@r2 .













@r2  0: (11)
Lemma 1. The migrant’s objective admits an interior maximum if and only if, at this point,
marginal returns to remittances are decreasing.
Proof. See Appendix.
An implication of Lemma 1 is that a necessary condition for savings and remittances to be
simultaneously interior is decreasing marginal propensity to invest for the parent: @2x
@r2  0:
Proposition 1. If the migrant is risk-neutral and if the parent’s marginal propensity to invest
does not decrease with income, interior savings and remittances cannot be obtained simulta-
neously.
Proof. This result is a direct corollary of Lemma 1.
Under risk neutrality, the migrant simply compares marginal returns to both instruments.
Since the interest rate  is constant, the migrant starts saving as soon as returns to remittances
become lower that . However, marginal returns to remittances are unlikely to be decreas-
ing and, as a consequence, the migrant either saves or remits, but does not jointly use both
technologies. Indeed, let us analyze in details the second derivative of E(y) with respect to
remittances presented in equation (11). The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (11) is positive
and reﬂects the fact that remittances increase the probability that the migrant returns to the ori-
gin country. Indeed, the incentive to locate in the origin country in the second period is higher
if the family investment is large. Given that the latter is positively inﬂuenced by the amount
of money remitted, the increase in the probability to beneﬁt from the family investment there-
fore leads to the possibility of convex returns to remittances. In other words, if second period
location is endogenous, the more the migrant invests in his country of origin, the higher the
beneﬁts of return and the higher the probability to return. To the best of our knowledge, this
effect, which is sensible and robust to various modeling strategies, has not been studied in the
literature so far. The second term on the right hand side of (11) pertains to parent’s marginal
propensity to invest. According to Adams (1998), marginal propensity to invest is higher for
12households with a migrant member. This suggests that this term could be positive, reinforcing
convexity. This makes sense since poor families could ﬁrst allocate remittances to meeting
their basic needs. Besides, note that decreasing marginal returns to remittances would be more
likely if marginal returns to family investment R were themselves decreasing in the amount
invested. We have assumed it constant. The purpose of this simpliﬁcation is to highlight, later
on, the impact of risk aversion on the pure investment motive for remittances. Moreover, the
partial effect of remittances on the location choice would nevertheless remain under decreas-
ing marginal returns to family investment and would be a source of ambiguity for the shape of
returns to remittances.
Suppose that the parent’s preferences are described by an exponential utility function. We
have shown earlier that marginal propensity to invest is, in this case, constant: @2x
@r2 = 0 and,
hence, returns to remittances convex. From Proposition 1, we know that an interior solution
for both technologies (savings and remittances) is impossible in this case. This does not imply
however that the migrant remits an inﬁnite amount of money since she is prevented from
borrowing. If savings are at a corner, s = 0, the conditions for having a maximum interior in























The latter condition might be fulﬁlled even with convex returns to remittances. Indeed, the
more the migrant remits, the more her consumption path is distorted at the expense of ﬁrst
period utility. This cost is convex, while the beneﬁt in terms of second period consumption is
concave. In addition, the partial convex effect on returns to remittances is naturally bounded
since F(Rx) cannot be larger than 1. Once the migrant returns to the home country with
certainty, returns to remittances become constant. This allows to see that, under the sufﬁcient
condition that R@x
@r < , the migrant does not remit at all. This remark concludes the resolu-
tion of migrant’s optimization under risk neutrality.
As highlighted in the subsequent analysis, a ﬁnal implication of the fact that a risk neutral
migrant either saves or remits is that the strategy of sending remittances cum savings is mainly
driven by risk-coping considerations.
134 The precautionary investment motive
Let us now introduce risk aversion in order to discuss the precautionary investment motive for
remittances. We make use of the same set of assumptions regarding the timing of the game and
the income composition. The migrant’s preferences write







u(s + w + (Z   ) + Rx
   Z)dF(Z) +
+1 Z
Rx





where u(:) is an increasing, strictly concave function. Note that the representation of the
migrant’s preferences used in this section is based on the standard concept of expected utility,
which does not explicitly disentangle consumption smoothing and risk aversion, but which is
used here to keep the exposition as simple as possible. It is important to remember however
that this representation is another particular case of the Kreps-Porteus preferences deﬁned in
equation (5) where g (:) = u(:). We start this section by a discussion about the impact of
remittances on the risk composition, which provides new surprising insights.
4.1 The impact of remittances on the risk composition
We ﬁrst analyze how remittances affect the migrant’s risk structure. The usual intuition re-
garding this link states that investing in the country of origin in a context of uncertainty allows
the migrant to improve her exit option and hence to reduce the risk she faces. However, as is
shown below, the impact of remittances on migrant’s aggregate risk and on its composition is
more subtle than that. In particular, the impact on the exit option is ambiguous. In order to
proceed, it is useful to divide the random wage gap Z into two truncated variables determining
wages in the two locations. The migrant’s utility is then rewritten as




u(s + w    + Rx








u(s + w    + Z)
f (Z)
1   F (Rx)
dZ;
U = u(w1   s   r) + F (Rx
)EZ1u(s + w    + Rx
   (1   )Z1)
+ [1   F (Rx
)]EZ2u(s + w    + Z2);
14where Z1 
f(Z1)




E (Z1) = E(Z j Z < Rx
) = 1 (Rx
);
E (Z2) = E(Z j Z > Rx
) = 2 (Rx
);








Given that both random variables are deﬁned by the truncation level which itself depends
on family investment and thereby on remittances, their characteristics in terms of mean and
variance are endogenous. In addition, let us deﬁne  as the migrant’s degree of absolute risk
aversion. Utility rewrites
U = u(w1   s   r) + F (Rx
)u(~ c2o) +  [1   F (Rx
)]u(~ c2h);
where
~ c2o  s + w    + Rx
   (1   )
1
21















~ c2o and ~ c2h are the certainty equivalents of the second period consumption levels in origin and
host countries, respectively.8 In order to decompose the impact of remittances on expected





















Let us interpret this expression in details. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (13) measures
marginal disutility associated to a reduction of ﬁrst period consumption. The second term
pertains to the second period and indicates a marginal increase in the probability to return to
the origin country and to consume ~ c2o rather than ~ c2h. The third and fourth terms form together
the expected marginal utility of second period consumption. Assuming constant absolute risk
8We have made use of Pratt’s approximation of the risk premium.
15aversion, the effects of remittances (through an increase of family investment) on the certainty

































On the one hand, taking any type of density for the wage gap Z, if the truncation level in-







@Rx > 0. On the other hand, we have that the variance of Z1 increases through a larger







With those elements, it is easier to see how migrant’s income prospects are affected by remit-
tances. Let us ﬁrst discuss the effects on host country income prospects. On the one hand,
the expected wage in the host country increases. Recall that the second period location is a
decision variable. It follows that the migrant chooses the place where her income level is the
highest once wages are observed. Therefore, if returns to family investment Rx increase, the
migrant will require a higher host country wage in order to stay. On the other hand, since the
ex ante probability to return to the origin country increases, exposure to the uncertainty of
the host labor market is reduced. On the whole, anticipating her optimal location decision, ex
ante, the migrant’s income prospects in the host economy are unambiguously improved. This
is in this sense that intuition usually suggests that remittances protect the migrant against risk.
However, the effect is exactly opposite regarding income prospects in the origin country. As
far as the mean is concerned, the migrant is ready to accept lower wages in order to beneﬁt
from the household public good at home since her threshold on the wage gap increases. As
regards uncertainty, by increasing the probability of returning to the origin country, the mi-
grant increases her exposure to risk in the origin country. Whereas the most intuitive effect is
that remittances are a self insurance mechanism, the way the risk structure is impacted does
not guarantee that the aggregate risk level decreases with remittances (see infra). Remittances
only allow the migrant to transfer some risk from the host to the origin country. By doing so,
she can adjust the proportions of both labor markets risks she faces ex ante. Finally, it can be
noted that this mechanism only makes sense if the future location remains uncertain. If the
migrant returns (or stays) with certainty, remittances have no impact on risk, except as pure
16precautionary savings. In other words, they have no impact on the objective risk faced by the
migrant.
4.2 The impact of remittances on aggregate risk
Let us turn to the analysis of the impact of remittances on aggregate risk. Using the random
variable y deﬁned in equation (4), the risk-averse migrant’s utility deﬁned in equation (12) can
be rewritten as
U = u(w1   s   r) + Eyu(s + y)
= u(w1   s   r) + u(s + ~ y); (14)




y  V ar(y) and  is the migrant’s degree of absolute risk



















Proposition 2 describes the effect of remittances on the aggregate income risk faced by the
migrant and highlights the role played by the distribution of wage variances across the two
locations.
Proposition 2. Remittances are risk-reducing provided that  is sufﬁciently high, that is, the
variance of period-2 wages in the host country is sufﬁciently high compared to the variance of








)[E(y j Z < Rx
)   E(y)] (15)
< 0 () E(y j Z < Rx
) < E(y j Z > Rx
)
()  > r 
Rx   E(Z j Z < Rx)
E(Z j Z > Rx)   E(Z j Z < Rx))
2 [0;1]: (16)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 indicates, ﬁrst, that remittances decrease the aggregate income risk faced by
the migrant if her initial risk structure is such that uncertainty is mainly located in the host
country ( sufﬁciently high). This is in accordance with our preceding result about the impact
of remittances on the risk composition. Remittances tend to improve host country income
prospects at the expense of an increase in the origin country income risk. A transfer of risk
17from host to origin country can only be proﬁtable if the former was high enough as compared
to the latter. Second, it can be seen that the variance of y is minimized if
E(y j Z < Rx
) = E(y j Z > Rx
):
In other words, aggregate risk is at a minimum if the migrant’s expected wage, conditional on
location, is the same across the two possible locations.
An important implication of Proposition 2 is that r is itself a function of the level of
remittances, so that the latter’s effect on aggregate risk may be non-monotonic. In order to
illustrate that, let us assume that the wage gap Z is uniformly distributed with density f. The
next proposition states that the impact of remittances on risk is non-monotonic.
Proposition 3. If Z is uniformly distributed, r increases with remittances. Therefore, remit-
tances are likely to have a non-monotonic impact on aggregate risk, being ﬁrst risk-decreasing
and for larger values risk-increasing.
Proof. Under the uniform distribution, r = F(Rx), so that @r
@r = fR@x
@r > 0. Therefore,
for levels of remittances, r is likely to be smaller than , in which case, by Proposition 2,
remittances are decreasing risk. As remittances increase, r may become larger than , and
remittances become risk-increasing.
The impact of remittances on aggregate risk is largely driven by the fact that our framework
accounts for the location choice. More precisely, it can be argued that, in this setting, the
genuine self insurance device is the migrant’s ability to choose her location after information
about wages is revealed. Indeed, for any initial risk composition, the migrant is protected
against low wages by the ability to select the maximum of the two ﬁnal incomes. Moreover, as
we show in the following example, this instrument is most powerful if risk is evenly distributed
between locations. Example 1 provides the intuition behind Propositions 2 and 3, namely that
remittances are risk-reducing if risk is mainly located in the host economy and that transferring
too much risk towards the origin country might, at the end, increase the aggregate risk faced
by the migrant. In order to illustrate these points, we use a simpliﬁed framework where the
only decision variable is the location:
Example 1 Suppose an agent can choose between two locations fa;bg, where incomes are
random and given by
wa = w   (1   );
wb = w + ;
18where   F (): Assume E () = 0. Hence,
E (wa) = E (wb) = w
V ar(wa) = (1   )
2 V ar()
V ar(wb) = 
2V ar():
Ex ante, taking into account the optimal location choice, the agent’s income is given by a






w   (1   ); if  < 0
w + ; otherwise.
Let us ﬁrst mention that, in such a setting, the ability to choose a location after the risk is
revealed allows the agent to earn a higher income, on average, than if she was locked in one of




[w   (1   )]dF () +
+1 Z
0
(w + )dF ()
= w   F(0)E( j  < 0)
> w:
This result obviously applies to the more general framework of this paper. Second, let us
discuss the impact of the initial risk composition  on the agent’s aggregate risk. To this end,






































which, under the sufﬁcient condition that the distribution of  is symmetric, implies that  =
191=2.9 In other words, the risk that an agent who can choose her location faces is minimized
when the initial income risk is identical in both locations. 
As this simpliﬁed example illustrates, on the one hand, the location choice allows the
migrant to improve her expected income. On the other hand, it shows that aggregate risk
depends on the initial risk composition. More precisely, the more even the ex ante distribution
of risks between both locations, the higher the migrant’s ability to reduce her income risk
by moving. If risk is not evenly spread, remittances can then be used to decrease aggregate
risk. Indeed, remittances are a way to balance the risk composition provided initial risk is
disproportionately located in the host economy. Undocumented migrants are therefore more
likely to remit than documented ones (Dustmann et al. (2010))10. On the contrary, as stated in
Proposition 3, high levels of remittances may increase aggregate risk as soon as the distribution
of risk becomes biased towards the origin country.
4.3 Optimal savings and remittances under risk aversion
Migrant maximizes expected utility (14) with respect to savings and remittances. The ﬁrst


















































2dF () > 0:
10This result is formally derived in the section devoted to comparative statics.
20We are now able to formally distinguish the precautionary investment motive from the pure
investment motive. Marginal returns to remittances in a pure investment perspective are given
by
@E(y)
@r . As we have seen earlier, the magnitude of this term is unlikely to be large for at least
two reasons. On the one hand, the migrant only beneﬁts from the family investment with some
probability (that is, in case of return migration). On the other hand, there is an eviction effect
throughwhichpartoftheamountremittedisallocatedtoimmediatefamilyconsumption.Ifthe
interest rate in the host country is larger, the migrant should not remit at all, unless remittances
are risk-reducing. In this sense, they can be said to be sent for a precautionary motive.
The condition for the migrant to be simultaneously interior in both savings and remittances
under risk aversion is also given by Lemma 1, except that here the deﬁnition of decreasing
marginal returns to remittances takes risk aversion into account:
Deﬁnition2. Underconstantabsoluteriskaversion, themarginalreturnstoremittancesunder










It is important to highlight that the possibility of locally increasing returns remains under
risk aversion. However, as we have shown earlier, at some point, transferring risk from host to
origin country starts to have adverse consequences on the migrant’s aggregate exposure to risk.
It follows that, through this effect, marginal returns to remittances tend to decrease for large
amounts, namely when the probability of return migration becomes too important. Moreover,
if the migrant’s borrowing constraint (non-negativity constraint for savings) becomes binding,
the willingness to smooth consumption across time enters the picture and incentives to remit
are reduced.
To conclude this section, we have seen that the condition under which both savings and
remittances are strictly positive at the optimum is not always satisﬁed. The reason behind the
potential corner solutions, which are inherent to the subject under study, are intimately linked
to the potential convexity of returns to one of the migrant’s technologies, namely remittances.
Therearethereforecases wherecornersolutionsprevail, inparticularwhensavings arenil, that
is, when the migrant would like to increase remittances but cannot do it because of liquidity
constraints. The main difference between the two cases is related to considerations pertaining
to intertemporal preferences. Indeed, under interior savings, the migrant’s consumption path is
21smooth, while, under corner savings, it is distorted at the expense of ﬁrst period consumption.
In the former case, the remitting behavior should only be affected by expected returns and
risk. In the latter case, however, remittances are the only instrument to simultaneously affect
expected returns and consumption smoothing across states and across time. The last section
presents a comparative statics analysis which distinguishes the cases of interior and corner
savings, but prior to that, let us try to provide a taxonomy of the motives for remittances.
4.4 Remittances as pure or precautionary investment motives?
Figure 1 describes the type of motive for remittances depending on how those remittances



















Figure 1: Taxonomy of the motives for remittances
From the ﬁrst order conditions presented in equations (17) and (18), we know that a lower
bound on the returns to remittances
@~ y
@r is deﬁned by the returns to savings . Indeed, if both























In other words, if
@~ y
@r < , the migrant has no motive for remittances at all and would better
22only save. This case is captured by the lower right half of the ﬁgure, since the locus
@~ y
@r =  is
represented by the bold straight line of slope












@r >  (the upper left part of the ﬁgure), remittances become attractive for
one reason or another. If
@E(y)
@r < , the investment motive is irrelevant since savings provide
a better return. However, the fact that
@~ y
@r >  implies in this case that remittances are risk
reducing at the margin. Therefore, remittances are spent on a precautionary motive in this
case, which is represented by the yellow triangle. The opposite case is captured by the orange
triangle, in which only the investment motive is relevant, since
@E(y)




@r > 0. Finally, the white square represents the area where both motives are
met since remittances have a higher average return than savings and decrease the aggregate
risk.
5 Comparative statics
This section is devoted to a comparative statics analysis of the case of risk averse migrants.
Because of the potential convexities in returns to remittances, we have to take into consider-
ation the case of corner savings. In this section, in order to compute comparative statics of
remittances with respect to the different parameters of the model, we therefore distinguish the
cases of interior and corner savings.
5.1 Comparative statics of remittances under interior savings
The comparative statics rule is given by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The comparative statics rule under interior savings:
1. The sign of the impact of any parameter  on optimal remittances is determined by the
sign of Ur   Us. Formally, @r
@ > 0 () Ur   Us > 0.
2. The sign of the impact of any parameter  on optimal savings is determined by the
sign of 
Ur   UsUrr, where 
  Uss = Usr = Urs. Formally, @s
@ > 0 ()

Ur   UsUrr > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4. Comparative statics with respect to migrant’s ﬁrst period income (w1) under
interior savings:
1. Under interior savings, remittances do not depend on the migrant’s ﬁrst period income
(w1).
232. Savings are increasing in w1.
Proof. See Appendix.
This prediction may appear at ﬁrst in contradiction with the empirical evidence, which
establishes a positive link between the migrant’s income and remittances.11 This apparent
discrepancy does not invalidate the model for several reasons. First, introducing altruism of the
migrantwouldmodifythisprediction(Lucas&Stark(1985)).Second, wewillshowinthenext
subsectionthatthemigrant’sﬁrstperiodincomedoesaffecttheamountsremittedwhensavings
are nil. Therefore, if these empirical contributions did not control for liquidity constraints, the
average estimated effect of the migrant’s wage on remittances could be signiﬁcantly positive.
Finally, the result obtained in this model under interior savings is perfectly sensible. Indeed, a
migrant with interior savings should have a similar behavior to a migrant in the hypothetical
context of perfect capital markets. In the absence of liquidity constraints, the investment level,
and remittances in particular, should be optimal. Since the optimal level must be unique, there
is no reason for remittances to be affected by the migrant’s ﬁrst-period income.
Besides, in order to maintain a smooth consumption path, savings increase.
Proposition 5. Comparative statics with respect to the household’s initial wealth (wi) under
interior savings:
1. Under interior savings, remittances are decreasing in the household’s initial wealth
(wi):
2. Savings increase with wi.
Proof. See Appendix.
As a preliminary step in the interpretation of this result, let us rule out two sources of ex-
planation. On the one hand, notice that this result is obtained with strictly selﬁsh migrants. In
other words, it is not altruism which induces the migrant from poorer families to remit more
ceteris paribus. On the other hand, one could raise an argument based on liquidity constraints
and decreasing marginal propensity to invest. Put differently, remittances, by relaxing liquid-
ity constraints, would ﬁrst allow the household to seize remunerative investment opportunities
11See Lucas & Stark (1985), Hoddinott (1994), Funkhouser (1995), Brown (1997), Sinning (2009) and Osili
(2004) or Osili (2007) in the speciﬁc case of remittances motivated by investment.
24such as education, small businesses, etc. Following this line of arguments, the fraction of re-
mittances invested could be larger for poorer families and hence returns to remittances from
the migrant’s viewpoint. However, on the one hand, our result holds for a constant marginal
propensity to invest per monetary unit of remittances (see equation (3)). On the other hand,
as already mentioned, decreasing marginal propensity to invest would be in contradiction with
the results of Adams (1998). Rather, the explanation relies on a perfect substitution between
remittances and household wealth for ﬁnancing the family investment. In other words, this is
due to fungibility, that is the migrant’s inability to monitor the allocation of funds. If remit-
tances are interior, the migrant equalizes the marginal return to remittances to the interest rate.
There is a unique investment x of the migrant’s family which satisﬁes this condition. It follows
that the migrant remits up to a point where the amount invested fulﬁls this condition. Hence,
the richer the household, the more the latter invests by himself, and the less the migrant has an
incentive to remit.
Besides, in order to maintain a smooth consumption path, savings increase as a response
to the reduction of remittances.
Proposition 6. Comparative statics with respect to the initial distribution of risk between host
and origin country () under interior savings:
1. Remittances are increasing in .
2. The impact of  on savings is indeterminate.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result states that the amount remitted is larger if the risk is mainly located in the host
country. This result is in accordance with our analysis of the impact of remittances on the risk
composition and on aggregate risk and with the empirical ﬁndings of Amuedo-Dorantes &
Pozo (2006). The effectiveness of the location choice as a self-insurance device is the highest
if the risk is evenly distributed between locations. It follows that, abstracting from the pure
investment motives, an increase in  reinforces the importance of the precautionary motive.
The impact on savings cannot be signed. However, savings always play the same role,
namely intertemporal consumption smoothing. The effect therefore depends on the direct
impact of  and the subsequent adjustment of remittances on the distribution of consumption
over time.
255.2 Comparative statics of remittances under corner savings




























However, under corner savings, we cannot exclude the case of convex returns to remittances:
@2e y
@r2 > 0. As already mentioned, convex returns can be outweighed by the concavity of the
utility function and the willingness to smooth consumption over time. As a second element,
recall that, if migrant’s liquidity constraint is binding, remittances constitute a unique choice
variable with the aim of smoothing consumption across states and across time. Further use
non-expected utility for this comparative statics exercise is convenient. Starting from the gen-
eral formulation presented in equation (5), let us suppose constant absolute risk aversion, that
is,  
g00
g0 = , in which case ~ y is strictly the same as in the whole analysis of Section 4. In ad-
dition, let us suppose that  u00
u0 = . We can then proceed to the ﬁnal part of the comparative
statics under corner savings.
Proposition 7. Under corner savings, remittances increase with migrant’s ﬁrst period income
w1.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem on the ﬁrst order condition, we know that @r
@w1
has the same sign as Urw1 =  u00
1 > 0.
If the migrant faces liquidity constraints, it is intuitive that an increase in her migration
wage will translate in an increase in remittances. As we have discussed earlier, this is accor-
dance with the empirical literature.
Proposition 8. Under corner savings, remittances are decreasing in household’s initial wealth








Proof. The same reasoning applies and the sign of @r
































26since the impact on the parent’s investment x of one additional unit of household wealth is
the same as the impact of one additional unit of remittances (see (2)). Finally,








The intuitions developed earlier in the case of interior savings do not apply in this case.
Indeed, under liquidity constraints, the migrant’s remittances (and hence the family investment
level) are suboptimal from her point of view. Therefore, the increase in the parent’s own ability
to invest does not automatically result in a decrease in remittances. Rather, the condition states
that remittances are going to decrease if , the aversion to consumption ﬂuctuations over time,
is high enough. In this case, the migrant takes advantage of the increase in family investment
to further smooth consumption over time. Notice also that if returns to remittances are not
increasing at this point, the condition is automatically satisﬁed.
Let us ﬁnish with the analysis of the , that is the relative magnitude of the wage risk in
the host country compared to the origin country.











Proof. The sign of @r



















@@r > 0, as shown in the Appendix (proof Proposition 6). Hence,



















shown in the Appendix that this condition is satisﬁed provided that  is sufﬁciently large. The
intuition is the following. If the migrant has interior remittances, then the initial distribution
27of risk has to be sufﬁciently biased towards the host region so as to trigger precautionary
remittances.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we provide a theory of the migrant’s decision to remit under uncertainty and
link it to the future location decision. The model captures two crucial aspects of remittances,
namely that they can be considered as pure and/or as precautionary investments. To this end,
and since we focus on risk considerations, we ﬁrst analyze the pure investment motive as a
benchmark, and then introduce risk aversion, which needs to be disentangled from intertem-
poral consumption smoothing.
Under the pure investment motive, remittances are only used as long as their marginal
return is larger than the return to savings. Interior savings and remittances cannot be obtained
at equilibrium under the case where the marginal returns to remittances are increasing. This
case is relevant and is notably due to the endogeneity of the location choice.
Once risk aversion is introduced, other considerations enter the picture. We show that
remittances affect the risk faced by migrants in a more complex way than usually acknowl-
edged. On the one hand, remittances have a non-monotonic effect on aggregate risk. On the
other hand, their impact on the geographical location of risk might be counter-intuitive. In par-
ticular, remittances, by increasing the probability of return migration, increase the migrant’s
exposure to risk in the origin region, which contributes to deteriorate her exit option rather than
improve it. In fact, the genuine self-insurance device is the location choice rather than remit-
tances. Furthermore, the more risk is evenly distributed across locations, the more powerful
the location decision to mitigate this risk.
The model also provides insights about the role played by the migrant’s characteristics. For
instance, the initial distribution of risk between host and origin countries affects the remitting
behavior of migrants. Undocumented migrants, who are likely to face most of their uncertainty
in the host country, are shown to be more likely to remit. Also, the wealth of the family left
behind has a negative effect on remittances. However, migrants may face liquidity constraints,
and these constraints have an impact on the link between remittances and the migrant’s wage
at the time of arrival in the host country. Under interior savings, the migrant’s initial wage has
28no impact on remittances, whereas this impact is positive for constrained migrants.
Finally, let us discuss some of the assumptions of the model. First, we have assumed that
the return to remittances can only be captured by the migrant in case of return, which makes
sense if remittances are invested by relatives in social capital or in housing expenditures for
example. One might object that the migrant might be able to capture at least partly the returns
to remittances even though he/she remains in the host country. The main changes induced
by this modiﬁcation are to reduce the probability of return and therefore the intensity of the
convexity of returns to remittances. However, convexity still holds despite this fact and results
are qualitatively unchanged. Second, the migrant is assumed purely selﬁsh. Introducing altru-
ism towards the family left behind clearly provides an additional motive to remit. However,
altruism reduces the degree of convexity in the returns to remittances since the parent’s utility
is concave in remittances. Unlike the ﬁrst assumption discussed, convexity in the returns to
remittances may disappear with the introduction migrant altruism. Third, the paper does not
take into account the difference in purchasing powers between both locations. Technically
speaking, incorporating this aspect is equivalent to assuming that migrant’s marginal utility
of consumption is conditional on location. If utility depends on consumption and location in
an additive way, that is, under the form of a positive utility premium for returning in period
2, our results are unchanged since this would be captured in the parameter . However, if
both aspects interact with each other, for instance in the case of different purchasing powers,
the speciﬁcation differs. Let us discuss here some of the implications of this modiﬁcation.
The main impact of this assumption is that the migrant’s wealth, and her savings in particular,
would have a different value according to the chosen location. It follows that the probability of
return migration, which in our model solely depends on remittances, would positively depend
on both remittances and savings, given that a higher wealth has a higher value in the origin
country. As a result, the intuition behind increasing marginal returns to remittances would
apply to savings as well: savings increase the probability of return and therefore have increas-
ing returns. Moreover, in our basic framework, the two instruments serve different purposes:
savings are essentially used to smooth consumption over time and remittances can be used
as pure and/or precautionary investments. Introducing purchasing power parity would entan-
gle both considerations and both instruments. In this perspective, adopting this assumption
and, thereby, reconciling this model with the theory on precautionary savings would be an
29interesting avenue for future research.
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32Appendix 0
Taking into account the borrowing constraint and the non-negativity constraint for the family
investment, the parent’s objective can be written in the form of a Lagrangian:


































2 (R   1) = (   ); which implies that  >  () R > 1. It follows that the
borrowing constraint is always the ﬁrst to be binding.
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
For the interior solution to the system of equations determined by the two ﬁrst order conditions
to be a maximum, the Hessian of U has to be deﬁnite negative, i.e. second derivatives are




































By the arbitrage condition (10),
Uss = Usr = Urs  	;





The determinant of the Hessian is positive if and only if






























Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2



































   (1   )E(Z j Z < Rx
)  
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   (1   )E(Z j Z < Rx
) = E(y j Z < Rx
);








)[E(y j Z < Rx
)   E(y)] < 0
() E(y j Z < Rx
) < E(y)
() E(y j Z < Rx
) < E(y j Z > Rx
)




   (1   )E(Z j Z < Rx
) < w   
1
2
+ E(Z j Z > Rx
)
()  >
Rx   E(Z j Z < Rx)
E(Z j Z > Rx)   E(Z j Z < Rx))
2 [0;1]:
Appendix 3: Proof of Lemma 2
Applying Cramer’s rule to the system of ﬁrst order conditions, comparative statics of the inte-










































By the arbitrage condition,
@~ y
@r = , hence























> 0 () 





35Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4
In order to applying Lemma 2, we need the following elements:





= 0, since Urw1   Usw1 = 0;
@s
@w1
> 0, since 











where use has been made of the fact that jHj > 0 ()
@2~ y
@r2 < 0.12
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Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 6




















12The proof is similar to the one developped in Appendix 1 under risk-neutrality.
36By arbitrage, we have that













)Rf1    [E(y j Z < Rx
)   E(y)]g:





















































E(y j Z < Rx









   (1   )Z]dF(Z);











= E(Z j Z < Rx
)   E(Z) < 0:
Proof and discussion of Corollary 1
Since
@e y

















< 0 < 1;
37which implies that @r
@ > 0. Let us now analyze the condition that
@e y














































































= 2RxF (Rx)E (ZjZ < Rx)   2F (Rx)V AR(ZjZ < Rx) + 2V AR(Z)





> 0 ()  > e  
F (Rx)[V AR(ZjZ < Rx)   RxE (ZjZ < Rx)]
V AR(Z)
:
This condition can be compared to the condition on interior remittances. Indeed, if the migrant
has interior remittances, this means that the initial distribution of wage risks is sufﬁciently
biased towards the host region so as to trigger precautionary remittances. Formally, in order
to have interior remittances,  has to be larger than r which is deﬁned in equation (16).
Therefore, under interior remittances,
@2
y
@ > 0 is always true if r < e , that is,
Rx   E(Z j Z < Rx)
E(Z j Z > Rx)   E(Z j Z < Rx))
<




(E(ZjZ > Rx)   E(ZjZ < Rx))F (V AR(ZjZ < Rx)   RxE(ZjZ < Rx))
> V (Rx   E(ZjZ < Rx)):
A necessary condition for this to be true can be obtained by replacing Rx by E(ZjZ < Rx).
This necessary condition is
(E(ZjZ > Rx)   E(ZjZ < Rx))F
 
V AR(ZjZ < Rx)   E(ZjZ < Rx)
2
> 0;
which is equivalent to




2jZ < Rx) > 2E(ZjZ < Rx)
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